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Past research has investigated the motivations behind support to protest actions 
by mainly focusing on the relationship between the perceptions of protest movements and 
support itself. The aim of the present research is to extend this research also by considering 
the qualitative content of the claims advanced by the protesters. We analyzed whether 
supporting a protest depends on the legitimacy of the advanced claim (i.e. in terms of 
adherence to democratic principles) or on the legitimacy attributed to that group. One 
hundred and eighty Italian citizens (45.9 % women; M age = 41.64, SD = 13.69) responded 
to an online questionnaire concerning a protest movement. The design included 2×2 
conditions: non-threatening vs. threatening type of group and unbound vs. restricted 
protesters’ claims. The results showed that support given to the protest is overlooked when 
the group is perceived as more threatening. However, the perception of the protest group 
has no effect on value-oriented participants who instead focus on the claims.  
Key words: 
Legitimacy; protest; 
democracy; threat; 
value-oriented 
citizenship. 
 
RESUMEN   
Estudios previos han investigado las motivaciones detrás del apoyo a las acciones 
de protesta, centrándose principalmente en la relación entre la percepción de los 
movimientos de protesta y lo apoyo. El objetivo del presente trabajo fue extender esta 
investigación, considerando también el contenido cualitativo de las reclamaciones 
presentadas por los manifestantes. Se analizó si el apoyo a una protesta depende de la 
legitimidad de la reclamación avanzada (en términos de adhesión a los principios 
democráticos) o en la legitimidad atribuida a ese grupo. Ciento chenta ciudadanos italianos 
(45.9% mujeres; edad M = 41.64, SD = 13.69) respondieron a un cuestionario online relativo 
a un movimiento de protesta. El diseño incluye 2 × 2 condiciones: tipo de grupo no 
amenazantes vs. amenazantes y reclamación avanzada dilatada vs. restringida. Los 
resultados mostraron que el apoyo a la protesta se descuida cuando el grupo se percibe 
como más amenazante. Sin embargo, la percepción del grupo de protesta no tuvo ningún 
efecto sobre los participantes orientados a los valores a que en su lugar se centraron en 
las reclamaciones. 
 
Palabras clave: 
Legitimidad; protesta; 
democracia; 
amenaza; orientación 
hacia los valores. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Joining different types of protest (from signing 
petitions to participating in action movements) has 
become a socially acceptable and common behavior in 
Western countries (Norris, 2002). The panorama is 
largely heterogeneous: e.g. from the Tea Party 
movement (a conservative political movement which 
emerged in 2009 in the United States) to the Iran 
Human Rights (an international non-profit organization 
founded in 2007 that promotes campaigns against the 
death penalty). Political and social psychological 
research has shown that these protests either become 
relevant or disappear depending on the support they 
receive from the population at large (see Klein, Spears 
& Reicher, 2007; Mugny, 1982; Mugny & Pérez, 1991; 
Passini & Morselli, 2013; Rucht, 2004; Simon & 
Klandermans, 2001; Thomas & Louis, 2014). Indeed, a 
protest group needs support to emerge and bring about 
change. That is, social movements have little direct 
impact on policies (Giugni, 1999). Instead, they have 
indirect influence via public opinion: i.e. movements 
and groups influence public opinion which in turn has 
some influence on political decision-making. Thus, 
public opinion becomes crucial for protest groups: 
failing to have the support of public opinion undermines 
their major source of influence on policy. 
If the support from the population is essential 
for protest success, then some questions arise: why do 
people support protest in some cases and not in 
others? What elements do people consider in deciding 
whether to join a cause? These issues are indeed 
relevant not only for the study of political activism – i.e. 
how and why people engage in protests – but also for 
understanding why some protest movements receive 
support and others do not.  
Many scholars of social psychology have 
investigated the motivations behind the decision as to 
whether or not to join protest actions. These studies 
have mainly linked such motivations to models of 
frustration-aggression and relative deprivation (see 
Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin & Bialosiewicz, 2012), models 
focused on the perceived costs and benefits of 
participation (see Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996), theories of 
system justification (see Jost et al., 2012), and theories 
of social identity and social identification (see 
Klandermans, 2002; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; 
Stewart et al., 2015; van Zomeren, Postmes, et al., 
2008). Some inadequacies of the first two approaches 
have been already highlighted (Kelly & Breinlinger, 
1996; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Simon et al., 
1998). In particular, concerning third-party support the 
cost-benefit approach fails to explain why sometimes 
people support movements that may prove to be costly 
(i.e. in terms of personal time, money, and risks) and 
from which they do not get any rational benefit even in 
case of success (e.g. movements for the rights of 
Amazonian tribes).  
Alternatively, the application of social identity 
theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) to the study of 
movements suggests that support to protest groups is 
predicted by perceived closeness to that group (e.g. 
workers’ rights of one’s own same category), by social 
identification with that group, and by not perceiving it to 
be threatening or in competition with the ingroup (see 
Klandermans, 2002). Indeed, threat increases the 
negative perception of the threatening group and 
prejudices against this group (e.g. Meeus, Duriez, 
Vanbeselaere, Phalet & Kuppens, 2009). Thus, this 
approach mainly focuses on the perception of the 
protest group (i.e. the claimant) by potential supporters 
and on its influence on the decision to back it. Indeed, 
recent models explaining protest support considers 
identification with a social movement as the main 
predictor of collective action (see van Zomeren, 
Postmes & Spears, 2012). But does this effect just 
depend on the identification with the group regardless 
of the claim advanced or do people consider the 
legitimacy of the protest group’s demands in terms of 
fairness and adherence to more general democratic 
principles and values? Indeed, not all protest 
movements ask for an improvement in such principles. 
In this sense, in studying individual support for protest, 
it is relevant not only to consider the identification with 
protest groups, but also to focus on which type of social 
change these groups propose. Indeed, history teaches 
us that people often supported protest movements 
even when they did not propose a real change in the 
social conditions or they restructured inequalities 
among social groups instead of overcoming them. For 
instance, in the 1969 Libyan revolution, the groups that 
opposed unequal policies of the governing political 
regime, once they had taken over power, did not 
enhance social equality for all the social groups but 
rather structured another system in which one group 
dominated over the others, without producing a truly 
structural change (Bruce St John, 2008). 
An interesting analysis which considers the 
perception of the content of the claim and not just 
identification with the claimant is Kelman and 
Hamilton’s (1989) theory on legitimacy. Kelman (2001, 
p. 55, original italics) defined legitimacy as “an issue 
that arises in an interaction or relationship between two 
individuals, or between one or more individuals and a 
group, organization or larger social system, in which 
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one party makes a certain claim, which the other may 
accept or reject. Acceptance or rejection depends on 
whether that claim is seen as just or rightful.” According 
to the author, legitimacy can be indeed evaluated at 
least on two levels: the first concerns the legitimacy of 
the claim itself; the second concerns the legitimacy of 
the claimant, i.e. the person, group, or larger social 
system that makes the claim.  
Kelman and Hamilton (1989) used these two 
levels to study the influence that the authority has on 
the subordinates. Indeed, group members obey the 
authority to the extent that they perceive its legitimacy. 
However, the two authors show that people mainly tend 
to judge authority’s demands just focusing on the 
evaluation of authority’s legitimacy. That is, few people 
focus on the legitimacy of the claim, while the majority 
focuses on the legitimacy of the authority. Instead, 
when the authority issues a request, the evaluation of 
the legitimacy of the request – rather than of the 
authority – becomes crucial in judging the fairness of a 
demand in terms of justice and equality. The relevant 
point in Kelman and Hamilton’s theory is the 
consideration of individual differences in evaluating 
legitimacy. Indeed, which people focus on the 
legitimacy of the claim and which on the claimant? To 
answer to this question, Kelman and Hamilton 
distinguished between three orientations of citizens 
(rule-, role-, or value-oriented) described as different 
ways of conceptualizing and relating to issues with a 
political relevance, such as policy making. Rule-
oriented citizens are keener to follow rules without 
questioning the legitimacy of the claim. Similarly, role-
oriented citizens elaborate judgements on the basis of 
their role obligations, yet not questioning the claims 
itself if it remains within their obligations. On the 
contrary, value-oriented citizens base their judgement 
on universal values of justice and equality and thus are 
more likely to evaluate policies (Kelman & Hamilton, 
1989; see also Passini & Morselli, 2011). 
According to this model, the citizens’ political 
orientation does not affect per se the response to a 
legitimate authority’s claim. However, when a legitimate 
authority issues an illegitimate claim, value-oriented 
citizens are the most likely to oppose the authority 
against that specific claim. This effect was observed in 
a series of experimental designs that showed that in 
general people bypassed the evaluation of the specific 
claim (e.g. violation of basic human rights) and accept 
the claim when it was issued by authorities that they 
considered as legitimate (e.g. democratic authority, see 
Passini & Morselli, 2010). However, the citizens who 
based their political orientation on values were readier 
to disobey the authority’s claim than the others.  
If these two levels of legitimacy (claimant and 
claim) were used in the analysis of the individual-
authority relationship, it may be useful to apply the 
same model to study the influence that a protest 
movement has on people’s support. Framing the 
perception of legitimacy of disobedient groups and their 
claims may indeed improve the understanding of the 
dynamics behind the decision as to whether to support 
movements and to join a protest. For what concerns the 
legitimacy of the claimant (i.e. the group that makes the 
claim), this may be analyzed as the people’s 
representation of that group in relation to the society in 
which they live. That is, how much people consider that 
particular group to be in accordance with the 
established rules, principles, and values of their society. 
Moscovici and Pérez (2007) have shown that shared 
and common representations of minorities affect the 
way those minorities are approved or disapproved of by 
the authority and the population. In their study on the 
representations of Gypsy persecution in Europe, this 
minority was more likely to be accepted and supported 
by people when public opinion depicts Gypsies as less 
threatening. These considerations are not far from 
postulates in the approach of social identity theory, 
according to which intergroup dynamics (ingroup vs. 
outgroup) and the perception of the other’s threat play 
important role in supporting protest movements. Thus, 
in our model of protest groups’ legitimacy, we decided 
to focus on threat as relevant in evaluating the 
legitimacy of these groups. Thus, whether people 
evaluate legitimate or illegitimate the other groups in 
terms of the threat they pose to society’s values. 
However, this is only one part of the story, and 
not much is said about the reception of the claims that 
protest groups advance, independently from the 
legitimacy attributed to these groups. Protest groups 
may be indeed distinguished in relation to the social 
change they seek and the psychological dynamics they 
trigger (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Passini & Morselli, 
2013). In this sense, it may be pertinent to use the 
distinction between pro-social and anti-social 
disobedience (Passini & Morselli, 2009). Disobedience 
is pro-social when it is enacted for the sake of the whole 
society, including all of its different levels and groups. 
Instead, it may defined as anti-social when it is enacted 
in favour of one’s own group in order to obtain specific 
rights. Thus, although both forms of disobedience 
promote a certain social change, pro-social 
disobedience promotes a social change addressed to 
everyone, while anti-social disobedience is not directed 
to society at large and it preserves or reproduces social 
inequality (Merton, 1968). As the authority’s demands 
may be legitimate and illegitimate in relation to the 
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democratic principles they back, this classification may 
be used to consider the legitimacy or illegitimacy of 
protest groups’ claims. In this sense, the claims of a 
protest can be perceived as morally legitimate – i.e. 
supporting a social change enacted for the sake of 
every social group and/or a change benefiting some 
specific groups that do not clash with any other social 
groups’ rights (unbound) – or illegitimate – i.e. 
achieving specific and restricted rights for their own 
group denying the rights of the others (restricted). 
What are the consequences of attributing 
legitimacy to protesters (the claimant) rather than their 
request (the claim)? On the one side, we may suppose 
that individuals are more inclined to perceive 
threatening groups as not legitimate and thus more 
likely to oppose their protest independently from their 
claims. On the other side, some individuals may focus 
mainly on the legitimacy of claims per se, independently 
from who advanced them. These people would be more 
likely to support movements whose claims are morally 
legitimate. In accordance with Kelman and Hamilton’s 
(1989) theory, citizens with a political orientation based 
on democratic principles and universal values (i.e. 
value-oriented citizens) should be those who focus on 
protest groups’ claims. These citizens may decide to 
support protest movements as a function of the social 
change that they propose. That is, they should evaluate 
and support just the claims that they perceive as 
reinforcing basic democratic principles and differentiate 
them from those that are only aimed at achieving 
restricted benefits and dominance. 
 
2. HYPOTHESES 
 
The present study examines the effect of the 
perception of protest groups’ legitimacy – in terms of 
threat – on people’s support for their claim. The 
question is whether supporting or ignoring the protest 
group’s claim depends on the legitimacy of the claim or 
on the legitimacy attributed to that group. Moreover, the 
aim is to analyze whether the individual political 
orientation influences perceptions of legitimacy. 
In particular, we hypothesized that (1) in 
general people tend to consider the legitimacy of the 
group instead of the legitimacy of the claim to evaluate 
the protest groups’ claim; in this sense, people should 
give more support to the non-threatening groups than 
to the threatening groups, irrespective of the legitimacy 
of their claims. In addition, we expected that (2) value-
oriented citizens tend to support only those claims of 
protest groups that are legitimate – i.e. which support a 
social change enacted for the sake of every social 
group – regardless of the legitimacy of the group. 
3. METHOD 
 
3.1 Participants 
A total of 180 Italian citizens (54.1% men and 
45.9 % women) responded by accessing the Website 
and completing the questionnaire. Participants’ ages 
ranged from 19 to 75 years (M = 41.64, SD = 13.69). 
Job-wise, 31.6% declared they were clerical workers, 
22.5% freelance, 16.5% retired, 2.9% teachers, 2.9% 
housewives,/househusbands 2.9% unemployed, 2% 
students and, finally, 18.7% chose “other” or did not 
answer to the question. 
 
3.2 Procedure 
Participants were contacted via the Internet. An 
online questionnaire was constructed using 
Limesurvey, a survey-generating tool 
(http://www.limesurvey.org). A link to the questionnaire 
was provided to potential participants in an e-mail sent 
by various methods (e.g. mailing lists, newsgroups). 
The questionnaire was drafted in Italian. The design 
included 2×2 conditions: non-threatening vs. 
threatening type of group and unbound vs. restricted 
protesters’ claim. Participants were assigned to the four 
web questionnaire conditions using the minute of 
access to the site – even (Type of Group = Threatening) 
or odd (Type of Group = Non-Threatening) – and the 
second of access to the site – even (Protesters’ claim = 
Restricted) or odd (Protesters’ claim = Unbound). Using 
this system, participants were randomly assigned each 
one to either the non-threatening-unbound (n = 48), the 
non-threatening-restricted (n = 48), threatening-
unbound (n = 43), or threatening-restricted (n = 41) 
condition. In order to check and prevent a person 
reentering the survey site, the subject’s IP address was 
monitored.  
 
3.3 Measures 
Participants were first asked to read a text in 
which it was written that in Italy a group of citizens 
organized a protest movement against the institutions 
to request free access to dental care that is currently 
excluded from the national health system and results to 
be very expensive. They are planning a large protest 
and a petition to support their cause. 
For the participants assigned to the non-
threatening condition, the group consisted of homeless 
people, while for those participants assigned to the 
threatening condition the group was made up of 
Romanian immigrants. As in this study we were 
interested in the evaluation of protest legitimacy and 
support vis-à-vis a minority group’s claim, ingroup-
outgroup effects were controlled for by asking people to 
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evaluate the claims of a protester group representing 
both an outgroup and a minority in all the conditions. 
Romanians were chosen because they are usually 
portrayed in the Italian media as a socially distant and 
threatening minority (see Solimene, 2011). As concerns 
homeless people, some studies have pointed out that 
they represent an outgroup, although they should be 
perceived as Italians (see Harris & Fiske, 2006; Van 
Zomeren, Fischer & Spears, 2007). These studies 
asserted that ingroup-outgroup attribution depends 
from the salience of group membership in a given 
situation. In the text used, the common nationality fades 
into the background since it was not evoked. 
Concerning unbound vs. restricted claim 
manipulation, in the unbound condition the claim of the 
group was generally referred to residents in Italy, while 
in the restricted condition the claim was referred only to 
the protest group. Texts were accompanied by a photo 
of the protest group: i.e. two photos taken from internet 
depicting one a group of protesting homeless people 
and one a group of protesting Romanians. 
Participants were asked to indicate their 
perception of the group as a threat (“To what extent 
should the members of the Romanian [homeless] 
community be considered threats to society?,” from 1 = 
not at all to 7 = very much) and whether they were 
willing to support the group’s protest (“How much 
support would you lend to their protest?,” acceptance) 
on a 7-point scale (from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much). 
They were also asked to indicate if they were willing to 
join some form of political action such as (1) sign a 
petition and (2) attend a demonstration against the 
Government’s decision not to support them. Protest 
willingness was computed as the mean of the two 
actions (α = .78) on a 7-point scale (from 1 = not at all 
to 7 = very much). However, willingness to support may 
not be necessarily followed by a congruent behavior 
(Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). Willingness to 
support is a necessary but insufficient factor to predict 
protest participation. For this reason, in addition to 
measuring support and willingness, at the end of the 
questionnaire participants were asked to actually sign 
or to decline a petition of support for the protest 
described in the scenario (protest behavior). To test 
Hypothesis 2 and on the basis of Kelman and 
Hamilton’s theory, a Value-Oriented Citizenship (VOC) 
index which identified attitudes that reveal a political 
activism joined with a critical thinking towards 
authority’s governance and an inclusive attitude 
towards outgroups was computed. The VOC index 
follows the formula: 
 
 
where pm represents the individual score of 
postmaterialism, a the individual score for authoritarian 
submission and mieg is the inclusion/exclusion of other 
group score . Participants to all conditions were 
therefore asked to answer to these following three 
measures. 
 
3.3.1 Authoritarian submission 
 This construct was measured by a 4-item scale 
based on Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) 
(Altemeyer, 1996). The questionnaire was constructed 
and validated by Passini (2008). In particular, the RWA 
items were split up into items that are pure with respect 
to the underlying theoretical dimension (authoritarian 
submission), grammatically simplified and occasionally 
rephrased. People responded to each item on a 7-point 
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree). An example of item is “Our country will be great 
if we do what the authorities tell us to do.” Cronbach’s 
 was .69 and did not increase with the elimination of 
any item. 
 
3.3.2 Post-materialism  
The 4-item post-materialism scale by Inglehart 
and Abramson (1999) has been used for measuring 
post-materialist values. The respondents were asked 
two rank-type questions to choose the highest and 
next-to-the-highest priority indicator out of a choice 
from among four values (two materialist and two post-
materialist). The materialist values are: (1) keeping 
order in the nation; (2) fighting rising prices. The post-
materialist values are: (3) giving people a greater say in 
government decisions; (4) protecting freedom of 
speech. A post-materialism index was constructed 
scoring 1 = two materialist answers, 2 = materialist 
(rank 1) and post-materialist (rank 2) answer, 3 = post-
materialist (rank 1) and materialist (rank 2) answer, and 
4 = two post-materialist answers. 
 
1 In order to compute VOC index, variables were re-scaled to range from 0 to 1. Thus the VOC index ranged from -1 (high 
authoritarian attitudes and low on democratic values and inclusion) to 1 (high on democratic values and inclusion and low on 
authoritarian attitudes). In Appendix, means, standard deviations and correlations of all the variables of the research are 
presented. 
  R E S E A R C H  
  INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL  RESEARCH Supporting Protest Movements 
 
 
     Passini and Morselli (2015) Int.j.psychol.res. 8 (2) PP. 10 - 22 
 
15 
3.3.3 Moral Inclusion/Exclusion of other Groups 
(MIEG). The moral inclusion/exclusion scale 
constructed by Morselli and Passini (2012) was used. 
In particular, each time for three groups – specifically, 
French, German, and Iranians – the respondents were 
asked to choose where his or her position lies, on a 
scale between two statements (one identifying moral 
exclusion of the group, one moral inclusion of the 
group). An example of opposition is “It is necessary to 
avoid any kind of contact with members of this group” 
versus “It is necessary for all of us to engage in 
establishing constructive contacts with this group's 
members.” As in the original studies, a one factor 
solution was considered (α = .88). The higher is the 
MIEG score, the more inclusive are the attitudes 
towards the groups considered. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
Concerning the type of group condition, 
participants considered the homeless as a less 
threatening group (M = 2.51, SD = 1.41) and the 
Romanians as a more threatening group (M = 3.90, SD 
= 1.46), F (7, 172) = 42.45, p < .0001, η2 = .17. In order 
to test the hypotheses a regression analysis was 
conducted, in which type of group (categorical 
variable), protesters’ claim (categorical variable), VOC 
(continuous variable) and their interaction were 
regressed on acceptance, protest willingness and 
protest behavior (see Table 1). The model were 
estimated using residuals centering as implemented in 
the R package pequod (Mirisola & Seta, 2013). The 
results indicate that all the three models were 
significant and accounted for 33 % (acceptance), 35 % 
(protest willingness), and 13% (protest behavior) of the 
variance. According to Hypothesis 1, type of group was 
a significant positive predictor (reference: Threat) of all 
the dependent variables a part protest behavior which 
was almost significative: B = 1.57, β = .39, t(172) = 6.20, 
p < .001 (acceptance); B = 1.43, β = .39, t(172) = 6.24, 
p < .001 (protest willingness); B = 0.13, β = .14, t(147) 
= 1.80, p = .07 (protest behavior). Protesters’ claim was 
not a significant predictor on all the dependent variables 
a part protest behavior: B = 0.15, β = .04, t(172) = 0.58, 
p = .56 (acceptance); B = 0.28, β = .08, t(172) = 1.22, p 
= .23 (protest willingness); B = 0.17, β = .18, t(147) = 
2.29, p < .05 (protest behavior). Thus, in general 
participants supported the protest of the non-
threatening than the threatening group more, while no 
difference emerged concerning the claim’s legitimacy. 
 
 
Table 1. Regression Analyses of Type of Group, Protesters’ Claim and VOC on Acceptance, Protest Willingness and 
Protest Behavior. 
 Acceptance Protest Willingness Protest Behavior 
 B (S.E.) B (S.E.) B (S.E.) 
Intercept 1.85 (0.31)*** 1.33 (0.28)*** 0.02 (0.09) 
Group (ref. threat) 1.57 (0.25)*** 1.43 (0.23)*** 0.13 (0.08) 
Claim (ref. exclusion) 0.15 (0.25) 0.28 (0.23) 0.17 (0.07)* 
VOC 2.28 (0.44)*** 2.21 (0.40)*** 0.36 (0.13)** 
Group × Claim -0.46 (0.51) -0.88 (0.46) -0.11 (0.15) 
Group × VOC -1.48 (0.91) -0.12 (0.82) -0.07 (0.26) 
Claim × VOC 2.36 (0.90)** 2.37 (0.81)** 0.54 (0.26)* 
Group × Claim × VOC 1.89 (1.86) -0.59 (1.68) -0.35 (0.55) 
R2 0.33 0.35 0.13 
 
Note: Group = Type of group. Claim = Protesters’ claim. VOC = Value-Oriented Citizenship.  
*** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. 
 
 
In agreement with Hypothesis 2, Claim×VOC 
was a significant positive predictor of all the three 
dependent variables: B = 2.36, β = .17, t(172) = 2.61, p 
< .01 (acceptance); B = 2.37, β = .18, t(172) = 2.91, p < 
.01 (protest willingness); B = 0.54, β = .17, t(147) = 
2.10, p < .05 (protest behavior). Instead, Group×VOC 
was not a significant predictor on all the dependent 
variables: B = -1.48, β = -.10, t(172) = -1.63, p = .11 
(acceptance); B = -0.12, β = -.01, t(172) = -0.14, p = .89 
(protest willingness); B = -0.08, β = -.02, t(147) = -0.27, 
p < .79 (protest behavior).  
Simple slope analyses were conducted to 
illustrate the nature of the interactions reported in Table 
1 (see Aiken & West, 1991). Simple slopes were 
estimated with the R package pequod (Mirisola & Seta, 
2013), the models controlled for the type of group, the 
protesters’ claim and VOC simultaneously. Figure 1, 2 
and 3 provide simple regression lines of acceptance,  
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protest willingness, and protest behaviour as a function 
of protesters’ claim condition at high and low ends (±1 
SD) of VOC. Tests of simple slopes revealed that the 
association between protesters’ claim condition and 
dependent variables were elevated when VOC was 
high: B = 2.01, t(172) = 2.66, p < .001 (acceptance); B 
= 2.15, t(172) = 3.15, p < .001 (protest willingness); B = 
0.60, t(147) = 2.77, p < .01 (protest behavior). Instead, 
the association between the type of claim and the 
dependent variable was weaker when VOC was low: B 
= 0.65, t(172) = 2.06, p < .05 (acceptance); B = 0.78, 
t(172) = 2.74, p < .01 (protest willingness); B = 0.28, 
t(147) = 3.09, p < .01 (protest behavior). Thus, in line 
with Hypothesis 2, the more participants had high 
values on VOC the more they tended to accept and to 
be ready to protest more when the claim was unbound 
regardless of the type of group who protests (and thus 
considering only the legitimacy of protest group’s 
claims). Moreover, the more participants had high 
values on VOC, the more they signed the petition for 
the protest group’s claim when the claim was unbound, 
while they did not sign it when the claim was restrictive, 
irrespective of protesters’ group membership. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Acceptance regressed on restricted (0) and unbound (1) protesters’ claim for low and high VOC scores. Low 
score = 1 SD below the mean; high score = 1 SD above the mean. Claim = Protesters’ claim. VOC = Value-Oriented 
Citizenship. 
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Figure 2. Protest willingness regressed on restricted (0) and unbound (1) protesters’ claim for low and high VOC scores. 
Low score = 1 SD below the mean; high score = 1 SD above the mean. Claim = Protesters’ claim. VOC = Value-Oriented 
Citizenship. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Protest behavior regressed on restricted (0) and unbound (1) protesters’ claim for low and high VOC scores. 
Low score = 1 SD below the mean; high score = 1 SD above the mean. Claim = Protesters’ claim. VOC = Value-Oriented 
Citizenship. 
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5. DISCUSSION 
 
The issue of the motivations behind the 
decision as to whether or not to join protest actions is a 
central topic in social and political psychology. In 
particular, recent research has underlined the 
relevance of the identification with social movement 
organizations as a strong predictor of their support (see 
van Zomeren et al., 2012). These studies have indeed 
mainly focused on how the perception of social groups 
influences the support given to their protest action. The 
aim of the present research is to consider another 
variable: i.e., considering not only who the protest 
groups are (the claimant), but what they are asking for 
(the claim). That is, adapting the model advanced by 
Kelman and Hamilton on individual-authority 
relationship, we analysed whether supporting a protest 
depends on the legitimacy of the claim advanced or on 
the legitimacy attributed to that group. 
First, results confirm the literature by showing 
that when people have to choose whether to support a 
cause or not, the reputation and the common opinion 
about the group asking for support are relevant 
elements. Group membership is indeed a core aspect 
of judgment and determines the ensuing decisions on 
supporting protest movements. As a matter of fact, 
people more frequently support those groups that are 
perceived as not in competition with the ingroup or as 
deserving their aid, sometimes even regardless of the 
content of their claims. In line with the approach of 
social identity theory, vis-à-vis an outgroup protest the 
support to the protest is neglected when the group is 
perceived as more threatening. In addition and in line 
with Moscovici and Pérez’s (2007) study on Gypsies, 
participants declared to be most willing to support the 
protest when protesters are instead perceived as less 
threatening. Thus, the common representation of some 
social groups as threatening or as in opposition to in 
group’s values and culture generally has a great 
influence on their eventual support. 
Second, our results show that the content of the 
protesters’ claim plays no consistent role when people 
are asked to evaluate the legitimacy of a protest. As we 
tend to focus on the source and not on the content of 
information (Pornpitakpan, 2004), we therefore also 
tend to focus our attention on the person or the group 
that protests and not on the content of the protest. This 
is in line with Kelman and Hamilton’s (1989) theory on 
legitimacy by which in the individual-authority 
relationship the majority tend to focus on the legitimacy 
of the authority itself and not of the claim issued. The 
same process was therefore found on the evaluation of 
protest movements. This issue may constitute an 
obstacle to the development of a democratic and equal 
political system: focusing just on the claimant rather 
than the claim may bring to give support to those groups 
that show themselves as democratic but who pursue 
authoritarian policies or to refuse to give support to 
perceived threatening groups that instead promote a 
development of democratic values. 
Third, our results confirm Kelman and 
Hamilton’s hypothesis that legitimacy is not elaborated 
in the same way by all the people. In particular, results 
showed that so-called value-oriented citizens actively 
formulate, evaluate and question policies more than 
other people on the basis of the content of the claim. 
Value-oriented citizens focus more on the claims 
advanced by the group rather than the source of the 
claim: when the claim dovetail with their values (i.e. 
democratic and inclusive values, see Passini & 
Morselli, 2011) then the eventual perception of group’s 
threat is bypassed. In line with previous results (Kelman 
& Hamilton, 1989; Passini & Morselli, 2010), value-
oriented respondents are the most likely to support 
protest and to take action when democratic values are 
at stake. In addition, they also oppose – or at least do 
not support – conditions which might threaten 
democracy (i.e. those claims that run counter to the 
principle of equality) regardless of the democratic 
appearance of the claimant. This result is particularly 
noteworthy because it extends the political orientation 
theories mainly focused on the individual-authority 
relationship. 
Finally, similar results concerning protest 
intentions were found in respect to the actual 
respondents’ behaviors (i.e. signing the online petition). 
It should be noted that the statistical significance of the 
results on protest behavior was lower and that the 
independent variables explained a less portion of 
variance. Moreover, in the case of protest behavior, a 
direct effect of claim was found, by which people sign 
the petition more for inclusive than exclusive aims while 
no significant direct effect of the type of group was 
found. Thus, it seems that when people actually engage 
in a protest, they take more attention to the content of 
claims rather than their source. In deciding to give real 
support to a petition, people perhaps pay more 
attention to the content of the demand. Finally, the 
same interaction between VOC and claim concerning 
intentions of supporting a protest is found on 
respondents' behavior. This result suggests that the 
attention to the claim of protest groups follows a value-
based orientation to the political system. 
The findings of the present study have 
theoretical as well as practical implications. In addition 
to the literature investigating protest support, we think 
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that our research adds to these studies a focus on the 
content of such protests. Indeed, as history teaches us, 
not all the protests have the same intentions and 
purposes and not all sustain the enlargement and the 
development of democratic principles. Thus, in 
evaluating motivations behind protest support, it is 
relevant to focus on the claim advanced by protest 
groups apart from other aspects, such as system 
justification and social identification with the protest 
groups.  We think that considering the content of the 
claim adds some understanding of the dynamic 
between social stability and social change. Indeed, a 
theory conceiving the distinct effects of considering the 
legitimacy of the claimant vs. the claim, adds insight to 
the mechanism that lead to the success or failure of 
protests and minorities’ demands.  
The results of this study also suggest that 
people with a political orientation to values – i.e. value-
oriented citizens – are more likely to be evaluative to 
both authority and the protest group’s claims, and to 
engage in action. Thus, our data recommend a 
theoretical advancement in Kelman and Hamilton’s 
(1989) model of political orientation that considers that 
political orientation has an influence not only upon the 
expectations of the authority and the evaluation of top-
down policies, but also in the assessment of bottom-up 
proposals (see Passini & Morselli, 2013). In addition, 
our findings confirm and develop previous studies 
focused on the importance of the general population – 
the so-called silent or powerless majority 
(Chryssochoou & Volpato, 2004) – in fostering social 
changes. The “silent majority” may be considered as a 
passive advocate of social change – “torn between the 
influence of the majority/power that aims to reproduce 
its dominance (system-justification) and the minority 
that aims to influence them toward change” 
(Chryssochoou & Volpato, 2004, p. 360) – if and only if 
it is not aware of what change it is actually supporting. 
Instead, the silent majority becomes a “participative 
majority” if it is able to recognize those causes that 
promote the enhancing of democracy and universal 
ideals instead of reducing them. In this sense, people 
high on VOC tend to actively evaluate and question 
policies; in other words, those citizens conceive their 
citizenship as requiring active participation (Kelman & 
Hamilton, 1989). Thus, the study of this type of citizens 
can bring new insight on the bottom-up processes of 
social change, that is on the dynamic by means of 
which a certain type of relationship between some 
individuals or groups and the authority can lead to an 
extended change in the whole of society.  
These issues have clear applicative 
implications to enhance citizens’ active participation. 
Indeed, participation can be enhanced by promoting at 
the same time the active evaluation of authority’s 
legitimacy but also the active evaluation of protesters’ 
claims. Once they have gained people’s support, social 
protest movements might degenerate into authoritarian 
and exclusive decision-making system. Thus, in order 
to protect society and democracy a correct evaluation 
of protesters’ claims is essential to protect from anti-
democratic forces. A key recommendation for 
practitioners may be to promote educational programs 
and projects designed to develop a more mature 
relationship with the political system based on an active 
evaluation and assessment of the policies and 
ideologies of both authorities and protest movements. 
This research has some limitations which 
should be borne in mind for future research. The first 
concerns the types of groups chosen for the research 
which participants had to lend their support to, i.e. 
Romanians and homeless people. In the future, the 
analysis of the claimant’s legitimacy should consider 
other groups. For instance, groups perceived more 
“threatening” – e.g. radical extremists – should be 
considered. A second limitation regards the unbound-
restricted condition. Indeed, no control on the efficacy 
of this condition was made. That is, checking whether 
participants effectively perceived one condition as 
being more restrictive than the other. Then, in future 
studies other claims should be analyzed. Finally, future 
studies may analyze the joint effects of social 
identification with a particular group and three 
orientations identified by Kelman and Hamilton (1989). 
Indeed, social identification is a predictor of collective 
action that again seems to be focused on the claimant 
and not on the claim of the protest (see van Zomeren, 
Postmes, Spears, 2008). For better comprehend 
support to protest, it may be relevant to join prediction 
by both social identity theory and political orientation 
theory. 
In conclusion, the results presented in this 
article confirm the relevance of an approach to the 
study of protest movements which consider the content 
of such protests and do not just focus on the protesters. 
This is considered relevant in a period in which media, 
politicians and the population in general more 
frequently discuss about the way protest movements 
exhibit themselves rather than what they are asking for. 
Analyzing the content of protests and its effects on 
protest support may be relevant for social scientists to 
advance their research into the understanding of the 
development of democratic vs. authoritarian values.  
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7. APPENDIX  
 
 
Appendix 1. Means, Standard Deviation and Correlations Among Study Variables. 
Measures M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Acceptance 3.91 2.01 –     
2. Protest willingness 3.34 1.83 .83** –    
3. AUT 2.89 1.19 -.31** -.30** –   
4. Post-materialism 3.57 0.71 .24** .26** -.36** –  
5. MIEG 5.53 1.14 .27** .34** -.15* .27** – 
6. VOC 0.49 0.31 .38** .40** – – – 
 
Note: AUT = Authoritarian submission. MIEG = Moral inclusion/exclusion of other groups. VOC = Value-Oriented Citizenship. 
Acceptance, protest willingness, AUT and MIEG extended from 1 to 7. Post-materialism extended from 1 to 4. VOC extended 
from - 1 to 1. 
** p < .001. * p < .01. 
 
 
